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Aziz Haidar

The Palestinians in Israeli Social Science Writings

Series Editors: Fouad Moughrabi and Elia Zureik

Occasional Paper No. 9

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PREFACE

by Elia Zureik

In 1974 the American sociologist Seymour Martin Lipset commented on the paucity of research on the Arabs in Israel by saying:

> Almost none of the academic research and policy decisions about the problems of education, or social mobility, ever deal with Arab citizens of the country .... Articles about the Israeli situation which break down attainment and statuses by ethnic background are generally headed `The Israeli_____System´, but have no column for over 400,000 Israeli Arabs who comprise 14 per cent of the population of the state. (**Society**,1974:65)

Just over a decade later, with the Palestinians in Israel proper numbering more than 600,000 and comprising 16 per cent of the total population, the noted American political scientist Karl Deutsch reiterated this charge in his introduction to a volume of essays about Israeli society:

> It [the volume] contains not a single chapter by a social scientist of Arab background. Even if all Arabs should refuse any dialogue, their published views should be studied. Among the many references in the volume there is no appreciable number of citations from Arab newspapers, books, or scholarly papers, nor from the speeches and writings of Arab political leaders within Israel and the occupied territories, nor are even many names of such leaders to be found. So far as Israel´s Arab citizens or subjects are concerned, Israeli sociological research still is at a stage where it resembles the work of an honest hardworking veterinarian whose patients do not talk. (**Politics and Society in Israel:Volume III,** Ernest Krauz,Ed., 1985:4)

While both charges have more than a grain of truth, they do not depict

the total picture surrounding the status of Israeli research on the Palestinians. It is true, however, that compared to mainstream studies of the dominant Jewish majority, Israeli academic research on the Palestinians is miniscule but by no means insignificant. In writing for an English-speaking audience and conscious of the image portrayed of their society, Israeli social scientists have carefully avoided detailed analysis or even acknowledgement of the socio-economic and political conditions of the Palestinian minority in Israel. This is not to say that indigenous research, contributed in part by the Palestinians themselves, is not available in Hebrew, Arabic, and even the English language. Both Lipset and Deutsch are hampered by their unfamiliarity with Hebrew and Arabic in which some of this research has been written over the years. For example, shortly after Lipset made the statement quoted above, I uncovered no less than 70 sociological, historical, and anthropological studies by Israeli and Arab writers that focussed on the conditions of the Palestinians in Israel (**The Palestinians in Israel: A Study in Internal Colonialism**, 1979). Similarly, Khalil Nakhleh, writing two years earlier and focussing exclusively on Israeli writings, analyzed close to 50 such studies ("Anthropological and Sociological Studies of the Arabs in Israel: A Critique," **Journal of Palestine Studies**, Vol.VI, No.4, 1977). Indeed, an annotated bibliography on the same subject covering the years 1948 to 1976 lists 245 social science sources, the majority of which was published in English (Sammy Smooha, **Social Research on the Arabs in Israel, 1948-1976**, 1978:13-14)

The shortage of published material is only part of the problem, and in my view not the most important part. The other and more significant aspect of the problem is the theoretical frameworks adopted by Israeli researchers in approaching the Palestinians in particular and the Arabs in general. Invariably, such research reflects a culturalist perspective: it explains the

economic and political backwardness of the Arab sector in Israel by referring to the value system, religion and family structure of Arab society. This research generally neglects the politico-economic circumstances in which the Palestinians find themselves as a minority in a settler society such as Israel.

Dr. Aziz Haidar, a recent graduate in Sociology from the Hebrew University in Jerusalem who teaches at Bir Zeit University on the West Bank, undertakes in this paper to up-date existing knowledge about the research of Israeli social science on the Palestinians. By confining his analysis to mainstream social science output, he has proven to me that little has changed in the way Israeli scholarship has dealt with the Palestinians, since I made the following comment close to a decade ago in my above-mentioned study: "The central explanatory variable of Arab political, economic and social development appears to be best explained in the psycho-cultural syndrome. Little weight, if any, is accorded to objective conditions and the role of foreign domination, Zionist and otherwise, of the area."

Indeed, there is a remarkable degree of similarity between academic writings and official policy statements regarding the Palestinians. Haidar's work reveals that the mainstream of Israeli social science reflects and even reinforces government policies on the Palestinian minority. Critical assessment of such policies taking into account the objective political-economy of the Palestinians and their historic confrontation with Zionism is utterly absent from such academic research.

I should hasten to add that, as Haidar points out, a minority of Israel's social scientists have ventured to comment critically upon their society and the position of the Palestinians in it. This minority, which includes such academics as Henry Rosenfeld, Baruch Kimmerling and Beit Hallahmi, has not

made an appreciable dent in the overall orientation of Israeli sociology.

I have benefitted from reading and translating from Arabic and Hebrew Dr. Haidar's paper. This exercise has strengthened my conviction that an important, even urgent intellectual task lies ahead for the Palestinians: unless they undertake to investigate in a serious and scholarly manner their own history and society, this crucial work will be relegated to those who are bent on either questioning or distorting the legitimacy of their existence as a coherent sociological and political entity.

The Palestinians in Israeli Social Science Writings

by Aziz Haidar

My original intention in writing this article was to survey sociological studies of the Palestinians published mainly in Hebrew by Israeli researchers.* However, after reviewing these researches, I became aware of a need to redefine the objectives of this assignment, for the following reasons:

(1) Israeli sociologists (and those researching in the humanities generally) who have written about the Palestinians have tended to concentrate primarily on the Arabs in Israel, as distinguished from the rest of the Palestinians and Arabs in general. The latter have been left to the so-called `specialists' often referred to as `orientalists.' While I have decided to restrict my focus to writings concerned primarily with the Palestinians in Israel, I shall widen the scope of the investigation to include the writings of social scientists, orientalists, and anthropologists; I shall not limit the discussion to the work of sociologists, as was originally intended.

(2) Moreover, not all Israeli writers publish in Hebrew; failure to include work published in English would yield a distorted picture of the overall thrust of Israeli research on the Palestinians. Such an omission would

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* This study does not deal with the entire corpus of Israeli research on the Palestinians. I concentrate on mainstream social science studies, recognizing that there exists other body of research which addresses the issue from a different and critical perspective. I have alluded at the end of the study to some of the recent thrust in this research.

preclude generalizations about the status of such research.

(3) I have tried to concentrate on studies conducted in the 1970's and the early 1980's. But in certain cases I have found it essential to refer to earlier historical studies in order to establish meaningful comparisons and trends over time, and thus show how Israeli writers have changed their perspectives on the Palestinians (for a more thorough treatment of this issue covering a previous period, see Nakhleh, 1977).

Organization of the material:

To organize the various studies dealt with here into thematic divisions is more meaningful than to deal with each study separately. Four main themes emerge:

(1) Social structure, which includes studies of the family and **hamulah**;

(2) Arab education in Israel;

(3) Arab economy in Israel;

(4) Identity of the Arabs in Israel;

We have added a fifth theme which is common to the those above:

(5) Arab mentality, culture and tradition.

As will become apparent, this last theme occupies a special place in Israelis' writings, since their world-view of Arab culture and value system shapes the mode of explanation which they advance to explain other spheres of Arab life.

(1) Social structure

a. The family

The reader familiar with Israeli research will recognize a basic premise: the development of a cash economy in the Arab agrarian sector is isolated as the major factor contributing to the disintegration of the extended family.

This premise is derived basically from Western experience, and researchers who subscribe to it argue that all societies eventually pass through the same stages of development. The study of Arab society thus becomes another test case in the chain of universalizing the validity of this premise (Avitzor, 1978; Golani,1967).

It is possible for us to predict the outcome of family studies which are based on the general hypothesis that "the extended family has disappeared from the Arab village" (Avitzor, **ibid.**:25). Nevertheless there are researchers who point out the permanence of the extended family; since their observations do not support the general expectation derived from western experience, the continuity of the extended Arab family is attributed to "cultural backwardness" (Stendel,1972:62). In contrast, Palestinian researchers who have confirmed the existence of the extended family attribute it to the specific socio-economic circumstances in which Palestinians find themselves (Kanaana,1975,1976). The phenomenon of "cultural backwardness" is conveniently invoked by Israeli researchers to account for other features of Arab society, as we shall see below in our discussions of economics, education and social development in general.

The works of Israeli researchers who address family studies from this perspective tend to suffer from three distinct inadequacies:

(i) Israeli researchers make assumptions to support hypotheses derived from other western industrial societies.

(ii) Researchers in this genre tend to generalize their findings based on one case-study of an Arab village. They fail to take into account that, in spite of the unique circumstances in which the Arab family finds itself, it has managed to acculturate in ways that reflect its specific experiences (see Haidar,1985[b]:306-307).

(iii)The third shortcoming is the most significant. Research of this sort

usually reflects or contains policy implications, and these are used to serve the political and propaganda purposes of the state. We shall say more about this in section five of this study.

b. The **hamulah**

Research on the Arab **hamulah** demonstrates its continued existence and, in certain cases, its increased strength and consolidation: such research explains why the **hamulah** continues to play an important role in shaping the contures of Arab village politics (Avitzor,1976; Ginat,1976; Nakhleh,1975). However, other studies have reached a different conclusion, namely that the **hamulah** has in fact disintegrated (Habash,1978).

Israeli researchers in particular do not see any connection between the political conditions surrounding the Palestinians (for example the policies of successive Israeli governments aimed at preventing the emergence of substitute political structures), and the way in which these conditions have **reinforced** the traditional political framework of village life. This phenomenon stands out most clearly in Avitzor's research on the Arab village of Taibeh (1978:25), for here the Arab village is studied as if it existed in isolation from the broader political-economic context. There are researchers who acknowledge the role played by the authorities in strengthening traditional social structures, but they assume that this role ceased with the dismantling of the military government in the Arab sector in the mid-1960's. In any case, glaring contradictions appear in the writings of these researchers:

> In effect the orientation adopted by the [the authorities] towards the Arab sector relies on existing traditional structures and values, but in the process an attempt is made not to penetrate the traditional structure and keep any (state) intervention off bounds. (Peleg and Benjamin,1977:54)

According to this logic, the authorities expect to interact with traditional

structures by drawing on the sustained strength of the **hamulah** as representing the Arab village, while maintaining that they do not intervene in existing arrangements for political representation in the Arab village. Furthermore, the authors concur on the same page that "from a political perspective, the authorities refuse to recognize the existence of a young educated [alternate] elite," even while they emphasize that the authorities do not intervene in local political conflicts in the Arab village!

While a few writers do admit the role played by the government in perpetuating traditional political structures, most continue to see the **hamulah** as an independent structure in its own right. In such a view, the **hamulah** dictates the shape of development in the Arab sector -- or more accurately, prevents the needed development from taking place -- bearing in mind that the Arab village finds itself constantly face to face with the urban culture characteristic of Israeli society.

(2) **Arab Education**

As with other spheres of Arab life, we find a paucity of comprehensive research on the status of Arab education in Israel. A review article on educational research in Israel -- which covered 1671 articles and spanned a period of seven years, from 1974 to 1981 -- concluded that only 36 studies, or 2.1 per cent of the total, dealt with the Arabs in Israel (Teitelbaum, Peretz, and Langerman,1985:209). Israeli research on Arab education is characterized by the following:

(a) Generally, it tends to be of a statistical nature and traces the development of Arab education since the establishment of the state of Israel. This line of research, which tends to exaggerate the accomplishment of the government in the Arab educational sector, suffers from several problems:

(i) Researchers focus on the size of the student population in the Arab

sector and compare the growth of this sector over time, usually taking the early 1950's as the low point in this comparison. Frequently, researchers ignore the fact that, after 1967, the statistics regarding the accomplishment of the government in Arab education are inflated: they include the Arab sector in East Jerusalem, forgetting that education here has historically been developed independently of Israeli occupation (Winter, 1981:170-171).

(ii) Usually, the number of students enrolled in Arab vocational schools, as well as the number of such schools, are exaggerated. For example, official sources indicate that the number of vocational schools in the Arab sector reached 34 in 1980/1981 (**Statistical Abstract of Israel,** 1981:614). These figures are accepted at face value by researchers in the field. This author studied Arab vocational education in Israel and noted that there are **four** vocational schools proper in the Arab sector, in addition to thirteen regular high schools which provide in their curricula some vocational courses (Haidar,1985[a]:22-23).

(iii)While researchers in the Arab educational sector tend to classify the Druzes as a separate category from `Arabs,' they include them in the overall picture. This is apparent in the researches of Winter (1981) and Rekhess (1981). In his study of Arab intellectuals in Israel, Rekhess included the Druzes in his statistical profile, but did not address them in his investigations of the political orientations of Arab intellectuals (180).

(b) Researchers tend to attribute changes in the Arab educational sector to the government in the first instance, and ignore the initiatives of the Arabs themselves. In particular, such researchers emphasize the centrality of the **Compulsory Eduaction Act** (Winter,1981:170-177). However, Palestinian researchers question the efficacy of this law in improving the overall level

of educational attainment among the Arabs, since it does not appear to have made headway in the rural part of the Arab sector (Mar'i and Dhaher,1976:52-53).

(c) From another angle, researchers attribute most problems in Arab education to the Arab sector itself and to Arab society in generral:

(i) Cultural background is seen as the main cause for the problems confronting the Arabs in Israel and of the large gap which separates the Jewish from the Arab sector (Winter,1981:168). From this it follows that the administration of Arab schools at the local level (including religious institutions) is responsible for this backwardness (**ibid.**:172).

(ii) Cultural backwardness is seen as the main cause for the proliferation of non-varied educational curricula in the Arab sector, particularly the retardation of vocational schooling. These cultural factors contribute to "unrealistically high expectations" among Arab high school students (Peleg and Benjamin,1979:527-529).

(iii)The same culturally-backward Arab society is held responsible for creating unemployment among Arab graduates of Israeli universities. Thus, the major cause of unemployment is the expectations of Arab university students themselves, who prefer to major in `white collar' specializations (Kressel,1981[b]:74-75). Arab university graduates are unprepared either to alter their field of specialization or to retrain in order to find a place in the employment market. This refusal to adapt to the marketplace is unlike Jewish university graduates, who are willing to do so:

> Those among the Jews with varied occupations, among old timers and new immigrants, were prepared to alter their line of specialization when they discovered that they could not find jobs commensurate with their qualification. Among the young in the Arab sector, it appears that they are less prepared than the Jews to change their occup-

> ations in line with those jobs where there is greater demand.... They point out that due to security reasons sensitive jobs are closed before them. (Landau,1981:203)

This claim implies that the failure of Arab university graduates to enter the labour market and to become an integral part of the Israeli occupational and stratification system is in no way related to government policy towards the Arabs in general and educated Arabs in particular; it is claimed that Arabs use political rationale to explain their own failure (Peleg and Benjamin,1979:529).

(d) Arab schools quite often serve as fertile grounds for Israeli researchers of various specialties. For example, most studies of national identity among the Arabs are carried out in high schools; their purpose is to uncover socio-psychological profiles of these students. While we dealt with some of these results in our review of national identity research, other investigators such as Rappaport and colleagues (1978) found the differences to be anchored in inter-ethnic and religious background. Moreover they point out that these students differ among themselves not only in terms of their orientations towards the state, but also with regard to the role of local government (166) and women's rights (167).

According to Peleg and Benjamin (1979), the vocational aspirations of Arab students are substantially higher than those of Jewish students (520), although Arab students express fears that their vocational goals are unlikely to be realized due to political and economic obstacles put in their way. In contrast, Jewish students emphasize personal factors and strength of will (524). We saw earlier that, according to these two researchers, Arab students resort to political and economic factors to explain their failure (529). These researchers rejected the hypothesis that Arab university graduates in the sciences do not enter the labour market because of `security' reasons. In-

stead, they suggested that to solve the problem of high and "unrealistic expectations" among the Arab students, these youths should "lower their expectations and adopt realistic occupational aspirations" (530).

In a separate study of Arab university students, the same researchers discovered that in spite of the various obstacles encountered in realizing their high aspirations, Arab students become positively oriented towards Israeli society during the last phase of their studies. This change is explained by `psychological compensation,´ which in turn accounts for their willingness to give up high expectations and to adjust to realistic circumstances (Peleg and Benjamin,1977:145-148). These researchers assume that their results are reliable, and make no attempt to explain the real reasons behind their findings. They note at the conclusion of their study that a large portion of their sample were teachers, which is true of Arab students attending Haifa University. The question remains, why is it that the political orientation of teachers becomes more `moderate´ compared to other vocations? The researchers in question did not bother to find out either how Arab teachers are appointed in Israel in the first place, or the role played by the security apparatus of the state in this regard . Rappaport and colleagues mention that "Arab teachers are hesitant to take part in discussion that deals with social and political matters," (177) although they did not illuminate the reasons why this is so. Prior to their investigations, Yehuda Bein attempted to shed light on this matter; he attributed the hesitation among Arab teachers to fears of reprisal by family and not by authorities (Bein,1975:6).

(e) Usually, researchers in Arab education do not conduct comparative studies which might show either the contrast between Jewish and Arab educational experience, or that between the Arabs in Israel and Arabs in the neighbouring countries. Why is this so? Is it because the standards of education in the Arab world have evolved faster, are more varied in nature, and have attained a

higher level of development? Or is it because the probability of Arabs succeeding in the high school matriculation examination in Israel is lower than that exhibited by the Jewish sector? (Peled,1976:8). The author of this study has documented the large gap which separates the Jewish from the Arab sector, particularly in the case of vocational education (Haidar,1985[c]:80), and has attributed this gap primarily to the policies of the ministry of education. Similarly, by comparing the levels of educational attainment of three Arab villages located partly in the West Bank and partly in Israel proper, Mar'i has shown that the former exhibited higher levels of attainment than the latter (Mar'i,1976).

As noted earlier, most Israeli social scientists do not carry out this comparison; the few `courageous' ones who attempt to do so conclude that the comparison is difficult to sustain because of the following reasons (Winter,1981:168-169):

1. The starting points in both sectors are unequal, hence uncomparable;
2. The Jewish sector experienced a higher level of urbanization;
3. The level of natural growth in the Arab sector is extremely high;
4. Arabs consider the educational system to be an exclusive government social service, and for this reason they are reluctant to invest time and effort in developing it.

Basically, these are the reasons postulated by Israeli researchers to explain the gap between the Jewish and Arab sectors. If Winter's hypothesis is correct, does it apply in analyzing the differences between Arab and Oriental Jews? And why such a comparison is never carried out?

In any case, with regard to Winter's final claim, Israeli researchers themselves have proven him wrong, particularly Assaf (1970:157) and Shimoni (1947:383) in their work on Arab education during the mandate period. Palestinian peasants were known to sacrifice their meagre resources in order to

improve educational standards in their villages. In the few instances where Winter attempts to contrast Palestinians in the West Bank to those in Israel proper, he attributes the retarded development of the Arab sector in Israel "to the fact that they [Arabs in Israel] constitute a national and cultural minority, which makes it difficult for them to enter higher education" (169). Why is this so? It is because the Arab student in Israel finds it difficult both to acculturate linguistically and to find a job commensurate with his qualifications, while those in West Bank do not face similar challenges! The logical outcome of such reasoning is that if the Palestinians in Israel wish to enjoy higher standards of educational attainment, they should be absorbed elsewhere!

(f) Readers of Israeli research on Arab education are faced with one central claim: the state of Israel has done what it could to develop Arab education, as proven by the statistical data marshalled in such research. Any problems which limit Arab education are caused by the cultural backwardness of the Arab sector itself. Clearly, the topics directly related to Arab education are left out of such research far more often than they are taken into account. The problems of standards, instructional methods, curricula, criteria for appointment of teachers (which, in the Arab sector, are essentially political) do not seem to be important areas of investigation. The writer of this study demonstrated in his M.A. thesis (1981) that these factors are the root of the problem; they account for the high rates of failure among Arab students, which in turn lead to the alienation of Arabs from educational institutions altogether. In those rare instances when Israeli researchers actually confront the problems of Arab education in Israel, they distort reality, and with one stroke of their pen, hope to solve the problem of Arab education by attributing it to Arab culture and society. Winter, for example, still sees the principal causes of the problems facing the educational system in religious

teaching and history curricula (Zionism and Jewish history, on one side, and Islamic religion on the other), although he claims that these problems have been solved! Landau, under the heading, "problems in education," similarly distorts the issue and considers the Arabic language as the main culprit behind problems in Arab education (1981:202). Finally we should mention that Yehuda Bein, in his book **The Tragedy of the Educational System in the Arab Sector** (1975), recognized many of these problems but had almost nothing to propose regarding their causes.

(3) **The Arab Economic Sector in Israel**

Israeli research on the Israeli Arabs rarely fails to emphasize the economic developments that have benefitted the Arab sector. Landau (1981:203) describes these developments in terms of leaps, and defines the prime cause of such a development as the effort exerted by the authorities to attain "material equality between the Arab and Jewish sectors" (203). As Landau sees it, the issue of economic development in the Arab sector is a matter of "employment opportunities," and is not one of the inequitable distribution of economic resources -- particularly government subsidies and allocations for development -- or the siphoning of such resources from the Arab to the Jewish sector. Therefore, when he turns his attention to the violent Arab protests during the **Land Day** of 1976, he goes to great lengths to show that land confiscation affected both Arabs and Jews. Moreover, he relies upon the declarations of none other than a director of the **Israel Lands Administration**, who points out that compensation was offered to the affected individuals. However, since the land is of little economic value, he is unconcerned with both the size of the compensation and the difference between these offers and the real market value of the confiscated land (209).

We have seen already how Landau handles the issue of employment opportu-

nities, particularly as it applies to Arab university graduates. He pointed out that the chief cause of high levels of unemployment among this group is their unwillingness to alter their career paths or to seek new occupational qualifications based on market demands, changes which the Jews make (203).

Far from being exceptional, these theses form the core of the writings of Israeli social scientists on the Arab sector. In researching the economic circumstances of the village of Taibeh in the Triangle, Avitzor defines the distinguishing factor in this village economy as the transformation of its work force from agricultural work performed inside the village to wage labour obtained outside it. At least 50 per cent of the labour force working outside the village is employed in agriculture (Avitzor,1978:23). What Avitzor does not mention is that these villagers work as paid labourers on land which used to be their own. Up until 1948, Taibeh used to be one of the wealthiest villages in Palestine, if not the wealthiest, due to the large land holdings of its residents, the fertile nature of the soil, and the abundance of its water resources. In researching the economy of Taibeh, the author of this study discovered that its confiscated land accounts for two-thirds of the land once owned by village residents (Haidar,1985[b]:110). In another study which involved six Arab villages in the Shagour (Biqat Bit Hakerem), Amihood Yisraeli counts eight reasons why the Arab labour force was transformed from an agricultural basis to nonagricultural wage work (Yisraeli,1979:72). One obvious reason did not occur to him: the confiscation of Arab land. In the village of Majd al-Kroum, the largest Arab village in the Shagour, two-thirds of the land owned by the inhabitants was confiscated by the Israel Land Authority (Haidar,1985[b]:245).

Bar-Gal and Soffir (1976) do not deviate from this mode of explanation when discussing the economic circumstances of the Arab villages in the Galilee. Decline in the value of agricultural work

> is due to the nature [of agriculture] in the villages of the [Arab] minority: the small size of fertile land; parcelling of the land; confusion in land ownership, and competition with developed Jewish agriculture. (1976:20)

Additionally, the decline of Arab agriculture is attributed to the nature of the Arab individual, who does not identify with the land or agricultural work: "compared to Jewish farmers, Arab villagers tend very quickly to desert agriculture" (64). This supplements the claim that the nature of land utilization in the Jewish sector is different from that in the Arab sector. According to Bar-Gal and Soffir,

> A result of the low priority given to irrigation in the Arab sector, differences in agricultural practices, and the varied emphases which typify the growing patterns within each sector, [is that] land use in the Arab sector is different from that shown in the Jewish sector. (63)

Bar-Gal and Soffir do not seem to know who is responsible for the distribution of water resources in Israel; they therefore attribute the low frequency of irrigation to Arab mentality. Moreover, this mentality dictates which branch of agriculture to concentrate on, which is why Arabs specialize in growing vegetables while Jewish farmers shift to more profitable types of agriculture (65). It is legitimate, they reason, to contemplate the factors which produce this specialization on the part of the Arab farmer: "What contributes to this change and specialization [in agriculture production] is water and training"(65).

The fact that water distribution, resources, and training are entrusted to the government is not taken into account by the authors. Ironically, when explaining any positive developments which have taken place in Arab villages, they do not hesitate to attribute this change to the policies of the government, and to the relationship between the Arab and Jewish sectors.

In connection with the availability of economic resources to the Arabs,

Gideon Kressel (1981[b]) appears to ignore the whole issue of land confiscation. What emerges from his discussion is that the process of transformation from agricultural to wage and manual labour is in no way related to government policies, the issue of land confiscation, or the distribution of water resources. On the contrary, he criticizes Palestinian researchers who considered these political factors when analyzing the transformation of the Arab labour force (72).

While many ignore the issue of land confiscation, there are other Israeli researchers who show their `courage´ by declaring that no land confiscation had taken place. In his research on four Arab villages in the Triangle, Ginat declares:

> The inhabitants of the four villages did not lose one single dunum of their land. Those who owned land west of the Emek and in whose place [Jewish] settlements were established were compensated... (Ginat,1976:3)

In attempting to verify these claims, I searched for documents which would show the size of the land area owned by Arabs before the establishment of the state of Israel, which was subsequently confiscated. With regard to the four Arab villages under consideration, I discovered the following:

Change in the Size of Land Holdings in Ginat´s Research for 1945 and 1962 in Dunums

Village	1945	1962**
Yamma	3650	1319
Beir Sakeh	3990	1270
Marjah	1270	770
Ibtan	1340	926
Total Area	10250	4280

*** Palestine Village Statistics,1945**
**** Israel Ministry of Agriculture,1963**

These data illustrate that land holdings in the four Arab villages have shrunk by 60 per cent of their original size. Of course, Ginat does not

explain where these losses went, although we do find the answer in another source:

> With the passage of time, the size of land holdings has shrunk through `strokes of pen´ and through the continuing segmentation of the land which accrues from inheritance practices. (Stendel,1972:68)

It appears that land shrinks through the passage of time and the inheritance system, while the authorities abstain from seizing it! Moreover, when Israeli researchers talk about the authorities´ intervention in Arab economic development, they tend to see it as progressing in one direction: the government intervenes in order to achieve equality between the Arab standard of living and that of the Jews (Landau,1981:203). For this reason, the government trained Arab farmers to improve the yield of their land (Bar-Gal and Soffir,1976:65), and provided them with irrigation:

> In essence Arab villages benefit from expanding irrigated areas in the Triangle where the pipe line of Mekorot goes through... The digging of wells had begun after the establishment of the state in order to utilize water accumulating in underground reservoirs. (Stendel,1972:53)

While Stendel avoids mentioning it, earlier Israeli researchers pointed out that the digging of wells in the Triangle began in the 1930´s; by the end of the British Mandate, the village of Taibeh had already utilized modern methods of obtaining water; finally, these wells are privately owned and do not belong to Mekorot (Golani,1967).

Bar-Gal and Soffir demonstrated that the changes in the employment profile of the Arab labour force resulted from the abolition of the military government and from the improvement which occurred in the Israeli economy after 1967 (1976:20-21). For these authors and others (see Yisraeli,1976), history started after the abolition of the military government, while the enduring impact of the restrictions which lasted for 17 years does not seem to

fall within the scope of their thought. However, as I mentioned earlier, any improvement in the economic status of the Arab sector is automatically attributed "to the impact of the urban Jewish sector upon the rural Arab sector" (Bar-Gal and Soffir,1976:19).

The official explanation for the economic retardation of the Arab sector is located in personal, social, and cultural considerations: "these are personalistic factors which are related to the social structure of the Arab minority and its general orientations and approaches" (Bar-Gal and Soffir, 1976:21). They observe of Arab economic behaviour that, "the orientation of members of the Arab minority towards investment stands in the way of effecting deep changes" (**ibid.**:34). A similar view was expressed by Gideon Kressel, this time regarding investment in cultural programs:

> ... The consumption of public services is minimal and public interests are conspicuously absent in comparison with increasing personal consumption [of goods]. In addition, the consumption of cultural services is very small in contrast to the huge and exaggerated investment in housing. (Kressel,1981[b]:75)

It appears that Israeli researchers are not aware of why Arabs invest in the construction of housing facilities instead of other projects. They do not seem to perceive the correlation between investment in housing and the bad living conditions in which the Palestinians find themselves; of course, they recognize no relationship between government housing policies and the heavy population density of the Arab sector. It is common knowledge to all (except the Israeli researchers) that housing in the Jewish sector is realized mainly through government funding; these public funds, in the form of subsidies, are never channelled to the Arab sector (Abu-Kishq and Geraisy, 1976[a]). It is common knowledge that Arabs are able to secure only a small amount of public funding, compared to that of the Jews. This is due to two factors: first, Arab villages do not fall within what the government calls "development areas;"

secondly, Jewish citizens can capitalize upon their military service and qualify for financial assistance.

The reader will deduce from studies such as those done by Kressel, Bar-Gal Soffir and others that the Arab sector is not lacking financial means; its reluctance to invest in its own economic development is due to "traditional [Arab] mores" (Kressel,1981[c]:103). The same logic is applied to explain the economic situation of the Palestinians on the West Bank and Gaza (Kressel, 1981 [c]:98-99). It appears that these researchers are unaware of the drastic differences of the standard of living between the Arab and Jewish sectors, a difference that places the latter in a highly advantageous position. They examine only one side of the official statistics. According to the latest figures, the average income of the urban Arab family is approximately 60 per cent of that of the Jewish family; these differences existed as far back as 1970. Statistics reveal that the average income of an oriental Jewish family has risen from 73 per cent to approximately 82 per cent of that of the Western Jewish family. These figures do not take into account the fact that the average western Jewish family size is 3.1, with around 1.6 earners per family, while the oriental Jewish family shows a family size of 3.8 members, with an average of 1.6 earners per family. The situation of the Arabs is substantially worse, with an average family size of 5.5 and 1.5 earners per family (**Statistical Abstract of Israel**,1984:293). As we mentioned earlier, these data pertain to urban families, and not to the rural, economically depressed sector in which a sizeable proportion of the Arabs live.

Similarly, official statistics show that Arab households are substantially over-represented among those classified as `low income´ (**Statistical Abstract of Israel**,1984:286-287). Moreover, the living conditions in the Arab sector are substantially worse than those in the Jewish sector. In the former, housing density amounts to 2.17 individuals per room, compared to 1.1 for the

latter (**ibid.**:300). In spite of these figures -- which clearly explain why Arabs invest heavily in housing -- Israeli researchers still insist that Arab investment in housing is not only a form of conspicuous consumption, but is also the main reason for the economic retardation of the Arab sector.

We have referred to claims that patterns of employment for Arab university graduates are determined by a preference for white-collar occupations instead of technical or agricultural jobs (Kressel,1981[b]:74-75). This claim ignores the fact that Arab graduates cannot enter engineering professions because "they have not served in the army." Kressel in particular does not ask, either why Arab instruction in the natural and applied sciences is weak, or who is responsible for devising educational planning policies and implementing them. Similarly, he does not ask why there are no vocational and technical schools in the Arab sector (Haidar,1985[a]). Instead, Israeli authors such as Bargal and Sofir attribute the lack of economic development in the Arab sector to "the suspicion harbored by the Arab population toward the government." Is this suspicion based on personal hatred? Or do the policies of the government lead to a feeling of mistrust? Furthermore, the claim is made that the Arabs are basically opposed to modernization:

> The difficulty with which a traditional society accepts modernization, in which the concepts of planning, supervision and direction are foreign to them. For this reason, plans that aim at providing a clear framework or those that are intended for development usually face too many difficulties, something which impacts on the entirevillage. (Bar-Gal and Soffir,1976:34)

In the light of the accusation that the Arabs refuse to accept comprehensive development plans, it is worth pointing out that the local authority in one of those villages which Bar-Gal and Soffir represent did submit framework proposals to the regional planning commission in 1972, and failed to secure approval (**State of Israel Auditor**,1973:7). The same local authority went back

to the drawing board and submitted another master plan in 1982. To this date, no response has come from the governmental planning authorities (Haidar, 1985[c]:207). It appears that Arab culture has contributed to the failure of all previous "development plans," as well as the efforts of the authorities to improve the status of the Arab village. These "cultural impediments" contributed to the failure of the first development plan which was implemented in 1962:

> The accomplishments were few and far between, due to the continued fragmentation of land parcels, lack of local initiative and innovation, and absence of the right approach to absorbing new methods. (Stendel,1972:4)

Astonishingly, Stendel forgot to mention the "cultural impediments" and how they torpedoed the initial development plans; he declared on the next page that this plan did attain its objectives in spite of these obstacles. Stendel adds that the mistakes committed during the first development plan were avoided during the second, and that during the latter a total of 115 million Israeli pounds was spent on the Arab sector. He offers this illustration without mentioning the proportion which this sum represents of the total budget for development plans in Israel, or whether this sum is sufficient to enable the Arab sector to implement the plans already on the books. Since he talks about the implementation of the two plans, let us assume, for the sake of argument, that the sum was sufficient.

But other sources show that Stendel committed an `error.´ Garaisy and Abu-Kishq estimated that the actual implementation of both plans does not exceed 20 per cent of the planned projects (1976[b]:20). Let us add to this an example which clarifies the `mistake´ committed by Stendel:

> According to the five-year plan for the development of the Arab sector, a total of 65 Arab villages should have been linked to the national electric grid between 1963-1967, and twenty-five additional villages between 1968-1972. In reality

> only 14 villages were connected to the grid during each of the above two periods. In other words, the plan covered only 26 per cent of the total. By July 1972, electricity reached 32 local communities in the Arab sector and eight were in the planning phase. (**Givat Haviva**,1972:3)

And this rate of success pertains only to the electricity plans. With regard to the overall development plans and their implementation, an Israeli commentator observed that, in spite of "cultural obtacles" (as Stendel would have it), "out of 94 Arab villages, 20 were developed in an acceptable fashion, 20 belonged to the Middle Ages and did not show any signs of development"(Emanual Yalin, **Ma'ariv**,7.2,1971).

In connection with Stendel's claims about the budget for implementing the first development plan, Zarhi and Achiezra (1966) remark that it was essential to invest a total of 130 million Israeli pounds in every year to enable 60 per cent of the Arabs to remain employed in their communities, as was foreseen during the two plans (Flapan,1962). But the sum that was raised over a ten year period amounted to 2.9 million Israel pounds, and most of it was raised from local and not government sources. This means that a total of 20 million Israeli pounds was invested each year, which is equivalent to less than 3 per cent of the total development budget for 1963/64, and less than 1.3 per cent for the year 1969/70 (Waschitz,1975:52).

It seems that Israeli researchers are unwilling to acknowledge the negative effect of governmental policies (not only in the economic domain) upon socio-economic development in general. In particular, they do not see a link between approval for the establishment of local councils in the first place and economic development of the Arab sector: it is known that the provision of essential services for economic development in Arab villages is contingent upon the presence of local authorities. Official census data shows that by the end of the 1970's, there were a total of 46 Arab local councils

(i.e., extending to less than 50 per cent of the total Arab villages); only 17 local councils were allowed to be set up by the end of the 1950's, 21 more were set up during the 1960's, and an additional eight were established in the 1970's (**Israel Census**,1979/1980:18). Moreover, the problems of a development budget for the Arab sector, which is low relative to the Jewish one, are not going to be solved with the establishment of local councils only (**Israel Census**,1975/1976:27-44). This form of differentiation extends not only to economic development projects but to budget allocations as well, which inhibits the normal running of the basic needs of the Arab sector, such as education, health, cultural programs, etc. This means that the general services offered to the Arabs are inferior to those provided for the Jews (Ben-Yitzhak,1981). Also, the painfully slow process by which the authorities approve zoning regulations in the Arab sector deeply affects the economic development of the village: without official approval it is risky to embark upon building and developing the Arab sector, because the homes may be demolished or the owner subjected to a stiff fine. It is a fact that most industrial and economic establishments set up by the Arabs do not receive official blessing, which means a precarious future for most of them. By the end of the 1970's, a total of four master plans were approved in the Arab region. This is quite apart from the fact that Arab investors, to the extent that they exist, are not allowed to invest in the industrial zones of Jewish settlements (see **Givat Haviva**,1972).

Obstacles to the development of the Arab sector which are not `cultural' in essence do not concern Israeli researchers. According to Kressel (1981 [b]:73), these cultural impediments in the Arab sector are the reason for the failure of Arab cooperatives. They are also the cause of waste in the disposition of Islamic Waqf funds and the conspicuous consumption of the Arab sector (**ibid.**:75). The trouble with Kressel's argument, which tends to put the

entire blame on Arab administrators, is that he ignores the fact that the Government of Israel is ultimately responsible for regulating and overseeing the administration of the Waqf property. According to Aharon Layish (1981), modifications in the law governing absentee property-owners have led to basic changes in the Waqf property which was released from government jurisdiction (144). In reality, however, Waqf property was not released from government jurisdiction. Why? It is because "the Moslems lacked official leadership and had no legitimate organizations which would assume responsibility for the Waqf sources" (114). As far as the family Waqf is concerned, it too was not released from government jurisdiction because "their owners are not in Israel and are employed somewhere else, and because they are ignorant of their rights." (116)

It is worth noting that one Waqf property in the city of Acre was eventually released from government jurisdiction and handed over to a committee after "an extended lease [for a period of 48 years!] to a corporation that was looking into the development of Acre." However, the role of this corporation is to empty Acre of its Arab residents; as admitted by Layish, "[the corporation] sank large sums of money in order to empty the residential houses, in order to renovate the historic sites, and to rent them as historic sites to attract tourists" (116).

In conclusion, we return once more to Gideon Kressel: not content to lay the blame on the Arabs, he goes one step further and encourages incitement against them, invoking the usual `security´ argument. He laments what he perceives as the conversion of agricultural land [which is Arab owned in the first instance] into residential areas: "there is increasing doubt that foreign Arab sources with plenty of money are pulling the strings and are encouraging illegal activities [presumable, the reference is to the expanding of Arab residential areas]" (Kressel,1980:164). In doing so, he repeats the

accusations levelled by Stendel against the Bedouins (1972:44)

(4) **National Identity and Political Behaviour**

National identity and political behaviour are central foci of Israeli research on the Arabs in Israel. Those who follow these studies are bound to notice the researchers' habitual tendency to minimize the centrality of the nationalist component of the Arab's identity in Israel; they do not consider the Arabs in Israel to form a distinct **national** minority. The following characeristics are typical of research on the identity of the Arabs in Israel:

(a) Split personality and dual national identity:

One of the first well-known studies in this field is by Peres and Yuval-Davis (1968). After studying Arab high school students between 1966 and 1968 they discovered that the national identity of the Arabs in Israel is split into an Arab and an Israeli component. Others who followed in their footsteps have confirmed these findings; however, we now have a plethora of research which negates them and asserts the crystallization of Palestinian identity among most Israeli Arabs. Avitzor (1978:29-30), in his study of the village of Taibeh, concludes that the Arab in Israel "is still searching for his national identity," a cause which explains for him the duality of identity. Peleg and Benjamin (1977:17-18) emphasized the duality which is typical of the identity of Arab intellectuals, particularly those who are confused about their Israeli and Arab loyalty (50). Landau makes a similar claim: the Arab is confused because of the split between his loyalty to the state of Israel and his Arab national identity (1981:197).

It is interesting to ask, "how do these researchers account for the split in national identity?"

(i) According to Peres and Yuval-Davis, the phenomenon of national duality is explained by the following:

> In spite of all the obstacles they face, the Arabs of Israel do not feel as if they have nothing to lose. The social and economic ties that have been forged [in Israel], as well as the fact that refugee land that was cultivated by local [Arab] farmers, constitute examples of property which the national movement is likely to take away from them... Attitude towards the liberation [by the Arab world] is ambivalent: while they do not abandon it, they nevertheless do not hasten its coming. (1968:109)

The explanation of Peres and Yuval-Davis suggests that the Arab masses who remained in Israel did not lose anything in the aftermath of the 1948 disaster: this is, in effect, to claim that Arab property was not confiscated, and that there remains no link between the Arabs in Israel and their refugee brethren across the border. According to this logic, the Arab in Israel has no reason to regret the events of the past; furthermore, he comes out as a `winner,´ since he makes full use of refugee land, thanks to the permission of the **Israel Land Authority**! It is obvious that that the authors are ignorant of Israeli laws governing land usage; they have read neither **Basic Law of Israel Lands** (**Book of Laws**, No. 312:56), nor the complementary laws pertaining to the application of Basic Land laws, which were approved by the Knesset (**Knesset Proceedings**,1960:1916).

Interestingly, these writers contradict themselves, since they refer on another occasion to the confiscation of Arab land as a reality of Arab life in Israel. They proceed to ask why the Arabs do not commit civil disobedience in response to land confiscation and military rule.

(ii) Avitzor and Landau attribute the dual identity of the Arabs in Israel to the Arab-Israeli conflict. According to Avitzor:

> The same state to which they [Arabs] belong has been, since its establishment, in a serious state of conflict with the neighbouring Arab states to which they have a feeling of affinity. (1978:30)

Landau adds the religious dimension to the Arab-Israeli conflict. The Arab in Israel feels a sense of belonging to the larger Arab world which is based on blood ties, religion, language and culture (but not nationalism?): "The Arab minority in Israel lives in the midst of a bitter and continuing dispute between the [Israeli] state and the [Arab] people to whom they belong; for a larger portion [of the Arabs in Israel, the conflict] is religious-political [in nature]" (1981:197). This argument reaches the conclusion that the conflict in the Middle East is between Israel and the neighbouring Arab countries; as far as the Palestinians are concerned, they are not an essential part of it.

(iii) In these writings, the Arab in Israel appears to be neutral regarding the Middle East conflict; he is in a dilemma regarding his loyalty to the two protagonists, since he appears to identify with them equally. Landau proceeds to make the point that the Arabs in Israel began to search in earnest for their identity after 1967, and that

> Their brethren in the occupied territories contributed to this by accusing them of maintaining Israeli loyalty and ignoring the element of Arab nationalism;... various media and television stations in the Arab countries [reinforced] this message. (Landau,1981:200)

(iv) According to Peleg and Benjemin, the dual identity of Arab intellectuals in Israel is due to three causes:

1. They feel psychological compensation as a result of being university graduates, which "compensates for all the other shortcomings felt in the past" (1977:145). It is also possible that higher education brings them closer to the core of Israeli society and indeed "reflects the central values of the society," while the values to which they are exposed in the workplace are incidental and liable to change.

2. The sheer contact between members of "minorities" of traditional background and "the liberal urban [Jewish] elite in Israeli society" is bound to change the attitudes of the former (145).

3. What does higher education contribute to the well-being of the Arab students? Education guarantees them a high status in society. Those who are educated become high school teachers, a job that bestows high position on individuals in a traditional milieu (148). The Arab intellectual is necessarily constrained in expressing his attitudes if he wishes to retain his status.

According to this logic, university education is for Arabs nothing but a psychological factor which compensates for all the other shortcomings and failings felt by them. As a result of being a university student, all material, spiritual, and national feelings are surrendered in order to gain psychological gratification.

(b) Denominational Differentiation:

Israeli researchers treat the Arabs in Israel as a collection of religious denominations and sects. This explains why Israeli researchers seek differences in Arab national identification based on religious affiliation. Rappaport and colleagues discovered that the orientations of Druze youth toward the state is the most positive, followed by Christian Arabs, and finally by Moslem youth (1978:131).

A study conducted by Yohanan Hoffman (1974:319) discovered that the Christian youth are more positive in their evaluation of the Israeli individual than are the Moslem youth. However, Hoffman stresses the Christian-Moslem differences in some situations while ignoring them in others. For example, when exploring why Palestinian youth emigrate and do not return, he overlooked these differences. Instead, he contrasted Palestinian youth

emigrating from Israel to those emigrating from the Occupied Territories: the former attribute their emigration to the lack of employment opportunities, while the latter tend to resort to nationalist explanations (322).

(c) Negative and Positive Identity:

Another facet of Arab identity explored by Israeli researchers is the so-called negative and positive traits. For example, Rekhess divides the Arabs into two groups: those with positive identity support the Labour Party and other Zionist parties, and those with negative traits espouse Arab national identity and do not support Zionist parties (1981:195).

(d) Palestinian National Identity

Very few of Israel's researchers dwell on Palestinian national identity or its crystallization, yet some acknowledge an apparent increase in the level of Palestinian self-identification among Israeli Arabs. Smooha, of Haifa University, showed that while in 1976 46 per cent of Israeli Arabs identified themselves as Palestinian, this proportion increased to 68 per cent in 1985 (**Haaretz**,23.12.1985). Other surveys confirmed this finding (Tessler,1977). Smooha perceives the identity of Palestinians living in Israel as continuously changing from "Israeli" to "Palestinian." However, Smooha does not attribute this adoption of the "forbidden" Palestinian identity to the organizational efforts exerted by the Palestinians themselves; these efforts are a drastic departure from the previous view of a weak and fractional Palestinian position, reflecting the situation of a persecuted national minority inside Israel.

Most investigations of the national identity of Israeli Arabs suffer from methodological and ideological shortcomings. The two are related:

(i) Research on the identity of Arab youth (most of whom are of school age) has explored primarily their identity and their attitudes toward the

state of Israel, and has relied upon questionnaire surveys in the process. In this case, researchers expect to obtain true and revealing answers in spite of the fact that the respondents live under harsh economic and political circumstances and must deal with the constant attempts of the Israeli government to separate them from the rest of their Palestinian and Arab brethren. Their isolation precludes integration in Israeli society, due to the fact that "Zionism is incapable of allowing them to be either this or that; proud Arabs constitute danger and those who are loyal [citizens] endanger the exclusiveness of Zionism and the Jewish State, and the rights of the majority" (Oppenheimer, 1979:43).

The problem of conducting surveys through interviews emerges clearly when specific instances are examined: for example, political questions while the military government which was imposed on the Arab population for 17 years and which treated the Arabs through a series of emergency military laws. It is sufficient to quote one question posed by Yuhanan Peres and Yuval-Davis (1968) to Arab youth at the conclusion of the 1967 War: "Should the Arabs wage further war on Israel?" These researchers expected to receive truthful and realistic answers, which would reflect the setback suffered by the Arabs and the consequent psychological downturn felt by the Arabs in Israel. All this occurred at a time when the researchers themselves described "the conditions of defeat" (110) and the circumstances "of fear from victorious Israel" (111) felt by the Arabs in Israel; specifically, one should not forget the harsh conditions which existed prior to the Six Day War and the economic and political pressure felt by the Arab population. This sort of climate is hardly conducive to freedom of expression on pressing political issues.

(ii) In most of their work, Israeli researchers rely on outward behaviour

of Israeli Arabs, without taking into account the **context** in which this behaviour is manifested. Let us consider two examples:

(a) Elections for the Knesset: Most Israeli researchers regard the participation of Arabs in elections as an outward sign which describes the political mood of the Arab village, as if these elections took place in a `democratic´ atmosphere. Peres and Yuval-Davis described the political behaviour of Arabs in Israel at a time when the military government was still in place:

> In spite of strong opposition to the military government and confiscation of Arab lands, no signs of civil disobedience appeared. Any political opposition campaign that may have been waged against the military government was organized by Jews and not by Arabs. It is interesting to note that [Arab] voters did not provide unconditional support to the forces that opposed the continuation of the military government. (1968:108)

The authors do not appear to understand why "strong opposing sentiments" were neither manifested in civil disobedience nor reflected in the outcome of the elections. Thus they ignored what they had written on the previous page: "This [military] rule applied strict surveillance and responded with various degrees of sanctions to any signs of disobedience or attempts to establish effective ties with the neighbouring Arab world" (107). While this answer provided by the authors themselves is not convincing, their naive question deserves a response. We located a suitable answer, one which relates to the period which the authors described:

> When he takes stock of his deep feelings and calculates the balance of his relationship towards the regime, [members of] the Arab minority are not differentiated in various strata or groupings. [His] stand is one and in solidarity. This is not his holiday [Independence Day], and he does not wish to celebrate it. The [Arab] minority will not boycott the tenth anniversary celebrations, in

> the same manner that they did not boycott celebrations in previous years. However, those who do celebrate do so, most of them, in order to receive prizes, or out of fear that [their failure to] celebrate would be interpreted as identification with MAKI [The Communist Party]. (**Haaretz**: 3.4.1958)

The question we pose is this: what is the outcome of supporting MAKI (pro-Moscow political party) or any other political force? The authors do not provide an answer. Is it possible that they are unaware of the fate of Arab youth, poets and writers who support efforts on behalf of the Arabs in Israel, such as the Communist Party, the Popular Front, or al-Ard group? (see Jiriys,1966:110-130). Similarly, have they not heard of the coloured cards, distributed by the military government on behalf of the ruling Zionist parties to the heads of the Arab families, in order to guarantee votes for the ruling party? And what of the pressure that is systematically applied during election time, which on occasions involves outright ministerial intervention? Referring to an election campaign meeting in the city of Acre in 1969, the late Yigal Allon remarked, "If the Arabs are interested in receiving social services, all they have to do is to frustrate the hope of RAKAH [MAKI's successor]" (**Alitihad**: 13.10.1969).

(b) Another example offered by Israeli researchers concerns the behaviour of Israeli Arabs on occasions when the **Hatikvah**, the national anthem, is recited in Arab Schools. Peres and Yuval-Davis are confident of a split in Arab personality after witnessing Arab pupils recite the anthem with "enthusiasm." Ten years later, we find the same perspective in an article by Rappaport and associates:

> Even in Jewish schools it appears that a total of one-third of the students participate in the singing of the **Hatikvah.** We find that one-fifth (20%) of Arab students in grade 9 and one-tenth (10%) of grade 11 sing the **Hatikvah** in general. It

> is interesting to contemplate what these students think when they recite the words of the national anthem. (1978:107)

While the same naive question is again posed, the answers are apparent in their own researches. The following explanation, provided by an Israeli Arab, was published before Rappaport and his associates published their results:

> In the school of Ramleh they made us stand in formation every morning and asked us to sing the **Hatikvah**, even before we learned Hebrew. The teacher dictated the words to us in Hebrew and we wrote them phonetically in Arabic. It was hilarious how various children regurgitated the words, at a time when they did not understand their meaning. For this reason there were different written translations of the words. After a period of time, when I read for the first time the song in its true version, I recalled how we learned the song without being prepared to pronounce properly the words, and I laughed very much. All the teacher had to say concerning the national anthem was this: "this is the national song of the Jews and the state of Israel and you should relate to it in seriousness. Whoever makes a move when the anthem is being sung would be punished." However, before the establishment of the state we also used to stand in formation and sing the national anthem for the `flag,´ the intent was for the Palestinian flag, except that [we were] allowed to move while singing the national anthem. It is clear that with the singing of the `flag´ I felt spiritual identification, something I did not feel towards the **Hatikvah**; here I felt a sense of alienation. (Al-Asmar,1975:24)

An answer such as this is not considered to be honest by Israeli researchers, because the author of these lines is regarded as one of the radical Arab writers in Israel (See Rekhess,1981:193, regarding the activities of Arab intellectuals in Israel). However, Rappaport and his associates do not seek answers to the rhetorical question posed by them, because such answers contradict their assumptions about the divided Arab personality and the differing modes of Arab national identification, which are considered to result from their religious and ethnic affilia-

tion. In the event that they encounter answers which are at variance with their assumptions, they tend to move away from the subject altogether. Researchers were surprised to find that Arab high school students know very little about Israeli civics (1978:178), but failed to point out that they did not find variations in the level of knowledge among the various ethnic groups. They did, however, assert that Arab students are uninformed about civics "not because they are unable to learn but because they **do not want** to learn." (180, emphasis in the original).

(iii)Investigators of identity conduct and plan research in ways that conform to and reflect their personal biases. We have seen how they adopt the methodology of survey research and direct questions, and how they observe outward behaviour without taking into account the context and environment within which this behaviour is manifested. Here is yet another example of methodological difficulty encountered in this research. According to Rappaport and his associates, "in spite of great efforts ... almost one-third of the respondents abstained from providing information about their religious identification" (181). The question is this: why are such extraordinary efforts required to secure information about the religious and ethnic identification of Arab respondents? Is the researchers' purpose not to confirm known 'facts' concerning the positions of Arabs from different religious and ethnic backgrounds on political issues? Or did they really exert efforts to reach the conclusion that "the testimony of the students in the Arab sector ... confirms what actually exists ... namely, that Israel is one of the enlightened states in the world?" (181).

Our doubts about the objectivity of this 'scientific' research, and the pressure applied on Arab students to reveal their religious and ethnic identifications, arise when the intentions of these researchers are revealed by their concluding recommendations. They suggested one set of objectives for the

`Arab' population and another for the `Druzes,' as though they were two separate peoples. For the Arab sector, they noted the need "to base the educational system ... on the principle of love for the country common to all its citizens, and faithfulness to the state of Israel, by emphasizing common interests of all the citizens, through nourishing the uniqueness of the Arabs within Israel and recognizing the culture of Israel" (193-194). Regarding the Druzes, they stressed the need "to love the country common to all it citizens, and [to express] loyalty to the state of Israel by emphasizing the specific common interests of the Jews and the Druzes, by recognizing Jewish culture, enhancing the Druze-Israeli entity, anchoring the Druze youth in its tradition and heritage, and [highlighting the] commonness among the Druze sect throughout their locale of residence" (194).

Thus, Israeli researchers inform us that members of the Druze sect possess a heritage and a culture to which they should become deeply attached, while the `Arabs,' who have no such culture, should immerse themselves in the Israeli culture. Moreover, the Druzes in Israel have a special status, and their fate is tied to those Druze who live in other places in the Arab world, while the `Arabs' lack such status and do not seem to have similar ties of nationalism and experience with other Arabs outside Israel. They are a unique `minority' who do not form a national Arab branch, separated from a larger tree to which they feel a special affinity.

(e) Political Behaviour:

Investigation of the political behaviour of Arabs in Israel is usually conducted in conjunction with examinations of their national identity. We have seen how Israeli researchers utilize voting, a form of political behaviour, to draw inferences about the extent and strength of Arab national identity. Let us return to the argument of Peres and Yuval-Davis that the absence of civil

disobedience among the Arabs in Israel before the late 1960's (when the authors published their research) was due to the so-called duality of the Arab national identity. We saw how Elie Rekhess also linked political behaviour of the Arabs in Israel to national identity, concluding that Arabs who vote in support of Zionist-led political parties manifest a positive identity, while those who do not support such parties manifest a negative one (Rekhess, 1981:195). As expected, Rekhess differentiates between `Arabs' and `Druzes' and dwells on the ethnic factor within the Arab segment of Israeli society. In his article on Arab intellectuals in Israel, he excludes the Druzes from his analysis of `extremist' Arab behaviour, even though he provides relevant statistical data on the Arabs which includes them (180-193). Rekhess regards the "extremist" behaviour of Arab intellectuals as a sign of ingratitude toward the Jewish state which transformed their "traditional" life into one that is more developed and modern (196). Similarly, Rappaport and his associates inform us that Moslem high school students are more politically active than either Christian or Druze students (181).

Some Israeli researchers ignore totally the issue of Arab national identity because they believe that the Arabs lack such identification. According to Gideon Kressel (1981[a]), Bedouin opposition to state policies and their increased "enmity towards the state" is caused by the "Arab-Israeli conflict, the Arab mass media, and the Kremlin" (164). Kressel advocates the adoption of stricter state policies because, in his view, Bedouins' oppositionary behaviour is due primarily to the laxity of Israeli authorities towards them. His explanation is similar to that advanced by a bureaucrat in the **Administration of Israel Lands,** in which the state is castigated for its tolerance of the Arabs and intolerance of the Jews! He writes: "What is forbidden in Northern Tel-Aviv is allowed in the South, what is forbidden in the Jewish sector is allowed in the Arab sector, and what is forbidden in the Arab sector is

further permitted to the Bedouins" (164). It is hardly surprising that Gideon Kressel does not perceive the connection between the behaviour of the Bedouins towards the state and their deprived social conditions (admitted by him), which are the result of what he calls such "lenient" policies.

As noted earlier, Jacob Landau attributes the political behaviour of Israeli Arabs to two influences: the incitement emanating from their brethren in the occupied territories, and to the mass media influence of neighbouring Arab countries (1981:200). He describes their relationship to the state as one of "increasing alienation," (208) whereby they are "turning into a greater and more integral component of the conflict between Israel and the Arab countries" (201). Landau provides the following explanation for the various failed attempts to launch Arab political parties:

> The reasons lie in the lack of political experience among the organizers and in the negative campaign mounted by other parties for fear that they will lose votes. (205)

Landau overlooked the state`s persistent policy of applying the **Emergency Laws** of 1945 (Jiryis,1966:13-59), and their up-dated 1979 version (Smooha,1980), to defeat any attempt at establishing a genuine Arab-based political organization in Israel. This policy is not unknown to Landau, Kressel, Rekhess, and others, since its existence is public knowledge and is admitted by those who hold responsible positions (Shmuel Toledano in **Yediot Aharonot**,8.1.1974). Indeed, according to a former advisor to the Prime Minister´s Office on Arab affairs, this policy is based on the premise that the state sees danger in the establishment of an Arab political party (Amnon Leen, **Haaretz**, 5.1.1967).

Avitzor analyzes the political behaviour of Arabs who suffer from `split personality,´ and shows that the proportion of participation in the Knesset elections in the village of Taibeh in 1969 reached 85 per cent. He attributes this to two reasons. First, is the "democratic" reason: the Arabs´ vote is due

to the presence of a democratic atmosphere fostered by the state of Israel which has struck roots among the Arab population. Second, the relationship between the Arab population and Israeli institutions is a permanent one and takes place on a daily basis, and does not depend only on the election period. Thus the Arabs find that these institutions "represent them truly," even though they lack direct representation in them. Moreover, the inhabitants of Taibeh know that Arab Knesset members are not their choice of representatives because "it is the parties who nominate them without consultation from the [Arab] electorate" (28). All this has taken place at a time when Zionist political parties opposed accepting Arabs as full-fledged members in their midst, while the Arabs, according to Avitzor, go on benefitting from the "democratic" atmosphere surrounding them. However, Avitzor ignores the role of the authorities in fostering inter-familial conflict, as well as the price that would have to be paid if the Arabs did not deliver their votes to the ruling party of the day, the very party that denies them full membership and participation in determining its overall policies. We should add that Avitzor's denigration of the Arab individual reached its fullest expression when he described an Arab as someone who cannot differentiate between friend and foe.

On the other hand, the sociologist Sammy Smooha speaks frankly of the conditions of the Arabs in Israel, something which other Israeli researchers ignore when explaining political behaviour. However, Smooha returns to the mainstream of Israeli research on the Arabs. He describes the relationship between Arabs and Jews as one of relative stability, and offers the following reasons: (Smooha,1976:415):

1. Economic dependency of the Arab on the Jewish sector;
2. Weakness of Arab political organization;
3. An Israeli policy which puts minimum demands on the Arabs to obey the law: "The Arab is given the freedom to express opinions of a nationalist

character as long as he remains within the framework of the law ... In Israel [they] do not harrass law-abiding and peaceful citizens;" (416)

4. Social isolation;
5. The Arab Israeli conflict;

It appears that Smooha is unaware of the contradiction between the first two reasons and the third one -- unless, of course, he considers economic dependency of the Arab sector and its political weakness to be matters unrelated to the Israeli policy. If it is true, as he claims, that the state does not harrass "peaceful law-abiding citizens," how can he account for the expropriation of Arab land? Is this done only to Arabs who have violated the law? More to the point, is there not a relationship between land expropriation and economic dependency? Is there not a relationship between economic dependency and weak political organization in the Arab sector? Is there not a relationship among weak political organization economic dependency, and relative tranquillity in the Arab sector?

Smooha answered the last question positively, although he does not perceive the positive answers to the rest of the questions. We wonder when the Arabs in Israel were granted freedom to express their "nationalist views"? What was the role of the military governor in the Arab sector, who on many occasions prevented Arab university students from attending university (Ze'ev Schif, in **Haaretz**,26.10.1956)? Why were the emergency laws applied against political activists during election times (**Davar**, 10.10.1965)? Why were Arab writers and poets arrested or put under compulsory house arrest if not for their political views?

Four years later, Smooha wrote another article in which he discusses at length political orientations of the state towards the Arabs. It aimed "to establish effective control over the Arabs in Israel over an unspecified period in order to neutralize them as a form of danger to the security of the

state and its Zionist-Jewish character, and in order to channel their efforts for the benefit of the Jewish majority" (Smooha,1980:14). In contrast to the previous article, Smooha recognizes the connection between land expropriation in the Arab sector and Arab political behaviour. In addition to the negative economic consequences for the Arab sector, land expropriation weakened them politically: "A basic fact of control stands out in terms of breaking up Arab territorial concentrations by means of land confiscation, and the establishment of a network of Jewish settlements" (1980:19).

Smooha inadvertently insists that the docile law-abiding Arab is not safe from the authorities, and that the authorities are not satisfied with his docile behaviour, but attempt constantly to cut off his contact with his brethern in other Arab villages. Furthermore, Smooha appears to be aware that political weakness is not a matter of obeying the law: the state's idea is to defeat any attempt on the part of Israel's Arabs to establish a viable political organization, even though such organizations operate within the law. "Attempts are made to defeat attempts by the Arabs to establish independent national organizations"(19). Smooha is aware that the state intervenes, even at the village level, to weaken the possibility of Arab solidarity: "The authorities encourage internal divisions "(19) within the Arab village. It is not clear whether Smooha retreats from his 1976 position or not. He does not appear to have admitted any contradictions between the two positions.

5. Arab Mentality, Arab Culture, and Traditional Arab Social Structure:

These three expressions were used, and are still being used, to explain developments (or, more appropriately, underdevelopments) in the Arab sector of Israel and in the Arab world generally. Such expressions are also used to account for the continuation of the Middle East conflict, as will be shown below.

To this point, we have demonstrated that Arab culture and mentality are usually invoked to account for the differences between the patterns of development of the Arab and Jewish sectors in Israel. It has been claimed that Arabs abandon their land and agricultural work in larger numbers than do the Jews (Bar-Gal and Soffir,1976:64); that they waste money on consumer goods instead of investing in viable economic enterprises (22); that they tend not to invest in educational facilities such as libraries (Kressel,1981:203); and that they create obstacles to the establishment of cooperatives (Kressel, 1981[a]:73). Social structure in Arab villages, which is a microcosm of Arab culture, is the primary cause of the failure of authorities to initiate modernization. Modernization and development "essentially come into conflict with the very nature of Arab village" (Stendel,1972:5). Social structure and family feuds prevent the establishment of various forms of cooperation (**ibid.**:57). The cultural gap between Arabs and Jews -- the differences between their basic values -- create "differing styles of thought, personality traits, aspirations, motivations, preparedness to defer personal gratification and consumption habits, leisure activities, traditional culture, etc. (Smooha, 1976:401). This is less crucial than the differences between the two sectors in terms of the disparities between a developed, modern society and a traditional one. This is reason enough to argue that "we do not expect equality in the distribution of economic resources between the Jewish majority and the Arab minority" (**ibid.**:405).

In the area of education, Arab culture is blamed for the disinclination of Arab students to pursue technical education (Winter,1981:173), and for their difficulties in adjusting to university education in Israel (169). High school students adopt unrealistically high aspirations (Benjamin and Peleg,1976,1979). This is the principal cause of many problems in the Arab educational system (Kressel,1981[a]:74-75), which in turn contributes to the

backwardness of the Arab sector (Winter,1981:168). Cultural backwardness lies behind the Arab tendency to build houses without proper planning and without the advice of professional engineers (Kressel,1981[b]:75); the same attitude is ultimately at the bottom of the "savage" sedentarization of the Bedouins in shacks (Kressel,1981[a]:163), and unauthorized construction in the Negev (Stendel,1972:44).

The clash between Arab and Israeli cultures is the explanation for youth deviancy among the Arabs (Shoham et. al.,1976). These cultural differences are perceived as contrasting individual traits: for example, while the Arabs hold a negative attitude toward the handicapped, the Jews hold a positive one (Florian,1977:191). When Israeli researchers confront "unexpected" cultural orientations among Arabs, they attribute them to the influence of urban culture and western values exemplified, of course, in Israeli society (Molcho,1980:481). In other instances, Israeli researchers are reluctant to acknowledge convergence between Arab and Jewish values (Moore,1977:51). Once the researcher in question is convinced that differences in Arab and Jewish orientations are not caused by cultural experiences, he declares it is "misleading to suppose that similarities between Arabs and Jews in Israel are related to similar environmental conditions" (**ibid.**:52). It is unclear why the author cannot declare that similar environmental conditions give rise to similar norms and modes of behaviour. But then, such an admission is likely to contradict the accepted assumptions regarding the rigidity of Arab culture.

Finally, we encounter studies that reveal unavoidable contradictions. For example, Elie Rekhess (1981) declares that the Arab village is experiencing such profound social change that it has been transformed from a traditional and conservative community into one that is progressive and modernized. He defines "the impressive advance in the Arab sector since the establishment of the state" as the "transformation of a society that has failed to one that is

making progress, by developing a flourishing agriculture, a comprehensive educational system, a modern transportation and road system in rural areas, and a fast economic improvement which brought about a general rise in the standard of living" (196).

Progress and modernization become a reality for Elie Rekhess, when in fact his intention is to praise the state policies which contribute to the advancement of the Arab village. However, Rekhess confronts a difficult situation in the rejection by educated Arabs of state policies: rejection of such modern policies could not be considered by educated modern individuals! In order to resolve this contradiction and to preserve the illusion that the state is undeniably modern and progressive, the fault must be attributed to the rejectionists. Rekhess is therefore obliged to deny the existence of so-called modernization in the Arab village, and to argue that the behaviour of educated Arabs evolves from the clash between traditional village values and the progressive norms of the Jewish city (186). Thus Arabs are seen to denounce state policies and their great efforts to bring about advancement within the Arab sector (196).

As we have seen, most writers attribute the entire "backwardness" of the Arab village to Arab culture and traditional social structure. Astonishingly, Israeli research on the Palestinians under its control does not recognize that state policies play **any** role in the underdevelopment of the Arab sector; instead, they are portrayed as the only force of progress and development. A one-dimensional absolution of the state from any responsibility for the conditions of the Arab sector is ludicrous, when central planning at the state level is a major feature of every aspect of Israeli life, including economics, social welfare, housing, education, etc.

Among the facts which are routinely ignored by Israeli researchers are those which challenge the permanence of `backwardness´ and `traditional

culture,' and show that Arabs are capable of adjusting to new circumstances. To locate these subtle facts of social change and personal adjustment, one has to penetrate the specifics of family life and personality, things that researchers consider to be embedded in immutable Arab culture and mentality. When change is acknowledged, it is represented as taking place in spite of the Arab individual, for example in economic life outside the confines of family life (Stendel,1972:4-5), or in accordance with his desire (Shoham et. al.,1976:205). However, in order not to contradict the original hypotheses of this research, studies of family life see change and adaptation as unlikely. Accordingly, studies of this sort do not admit certain progressive facts: for example, 97 per cent of Arab women deliver their children away from the home and in hospitals, and the same preference is true of the majority of Bedouin women (Schmeltz,1981:17). How else can one explain the drastic decline in birth rates among Arab women, which appears to have taken place without guidance or assistance from the government? (Friedlander and Golsheider, 1979:128).

We present these examples drawn from sensitive topics in `traditional' society to undermine the assumption that it is difficult to effect change in the highly private sphere of social and familial life. If an Arab can acculturate in the most intimate and private ways, why does he not accept modernization in other obvious public areas , which would enable him to overcome obstacles put before him in his daily life?

The reliance upon such concepts as Arab culture, Arab mentality, and traditional social structure to explain the stark differences between the Jewish and Arab sectors evolves from more general theories advanced by Israeli researchers to analyze the Arab world and the conflict of the region. Their analysis of conflict depends upon analysis of the Arab personality, in particular the Arab mind. As expected, they emphasize the negative character-

istics typical of Arabs, particularly the lack of rational thinking in daily conduct. The earlier writings of Yehushafat Harkabi are exemplary in this regard (1967,1972); he stresses that "lying" is a preferred trait of Arab behaviour. In looking for a scientific explanation for this phenomenon, Harkabi rejects current explanations and states that lying among the Arabs constitutes part of established, destructive, competitive behaviour that is anchored in the Arab individual. This thesis was re-stated by Sanua (1972) who attributes lying, and other negative personal traits, to the social and cultural framework of Arab society. Sanua goes so far as to stress that "killing" is regarded as normal behaviour in Arab culture; he therefore criticizes western social scientists who attempt to explain Sirhan Sirhan's motivation for murdering Robert Kennedy with concepts based on western experience.

These research efforts do not end with the usual negative descriptions of the Arab personality and mentality. One would have appreciated a statement of researchers' belief that it is possible to change these negative features of the Arab individual. Their objective, however, is to emphasize that these features are deeply rooted aspects of a culture that is unamenable to change. Thus, the conflict in the Middle East is portrayed between two protagonists, one of which is dynamic, flexible and changing (Israelis), while the other is rigid, fixed and unchanging (Arabs) (Peres and Levy,1969).

Conclusion

The Arabs in Israeli Research: Anything New?

From this overview of Israeli research on Arabs in general and Palestinians in particular, we can deduce both that it is based on shared sociological assumptions and that it serves political ends. These claims are based on evidence that such theorizing arises from specific Zionist definitions and

persepctives regarding the Palestinians and Arabs. This is not new; these assumptions have been prevalent since the inception of Zionism:

> In the early stages of Zionism, until the mid-1920's and even into the 1930's, Arabs in Palestine and in adjacent territories... were most often seen as non-people. They seemed politically apathetic under Turkish and later British rule, most of them scattered in their villages like so much human dust (Deutsch,1985:3).

This writer believes that subsequent events during the latter days of the British Mandate in Palestine, as well as the overtures of Arab leaders to Germany during the war, have left "lasting impressions" which, to this day,

> overshadow ... in the minds of most Israelis any concern about the human, civic, economic, and cultural concerns of their Arab neighbours within Israel and in the territories that are occupied and administered by Israeli forces, as well as in the rest of the Arab World (**ibid.**:3).

While Deutsch does not condone such narrowness, he sees it as an explanation for why Israeli investigators tend to ignore Arabs in their research. In addition, teachings about the Arabs, particularly the Palestinians, have by and large been left out of the social sciences and humanities curricula (see Haidar, 1985[c]:73-79). Research on Arab society in Israel has been left to `specialists' known as `Arabists.' This fact is accepted by Israeli scholars in the same way that they know that "these are orientalists who work in the intelligence apparatus and act as commentators [on the Arabs] in the media" (Hareven,1985:18). It does not appear that the situation will improve in the future. Hareven, who is well known for his efforts to promote Arab-Jewish relations, has suggested fundamental changes in the orientation of Israeli researchers on the Arabs. However, he did not see any shortcoming in the hesitation of social science researchers in "dealing" with the Arabs (Hareven,1985:27). Karl Deutsch's criticism of Israeli research on Arab society (or the lack thereof) rejected any rationalizations about unfamiliarity with

the Arabic language. It is worth pointing out here that a large number of Israeli researchers specialize in the study of societies in Latin America, Africa, Japan, and China without being experts in the relevant languages.

Clearly, the neglect of Palestinian and other Arabs is due to ideological and political factors. Particularly in the humanities and sociology, researchers consider the Arabs to constitute a marginal group and therefore the study of them adds little to an overall understanding of Israeli society (see, for example, Eisenstadt,1967). Their focus is on Israeli society and its relationship to the Jewish Diaspora, to Jewish nation-building, the **Kibbutz**, immigrant absorption, the **Moshav** and **Yishuv**. With this clearer picture, we can appreciate why the number of Israeli social scientists interested in studying the Arab world remains small, while the number of the Arabists is increasing:

> ... so far as Israel's Arab citizens or subjects are concerned, Israeli research is still at a stage where it resembles the work of an honest and hardworking veterinarian whose patients do not talk (Deutsch,**op.cit.**:4)

As this essay has shown, the work of most Israeli social scientists who have studied Arab society is characterized by the following:

1. The majority of the research is of the `scientific-public relations' variety. By `scientific,' we mean only that it appears to be scientific and objective while, like all other politically-motivated work, its purpose is to reinforce the policies of the current government. Moreover, these researchers are used by official spokesmen to convey to other Israelis and foreigners that the gap which separates Jews from Arabs is due to cultural differences and the rigidity of Arab society and values. The general backwardness of the Arab is seen the reason for conflict in the Middle East. This conflict is thus reduced to a collision between primitive Arab mentality and an advanvced Jewish one. As long as the Arabs remain locked into their rigid framework, the conflict in the Middle East will continue.

Efforts of these academic `specialists´ to `explain´ to Israel and the rest of the world that there is no such concept as the Palestinian nation (Shamir,1985:7) testifies to the propaganda function of these researchers. This is especially true of the `orientalists,´ who are instrumental in publicising government policies.

2. Invariably, these researchers exaggerate the extent of progress that has taken place among the Palestinians in Israel proper and among those who live in the West Bank and Gaza: in addition, they attribute this improvement to contact with Israeli society and government efforts. The Arabs´ lack of integration in Israeli society is explained by the deep cultural gaps between the two peoples and the animosity of the Arab world toward Israel. The propositions advanced in these studies are distorted in four ways:

a. The cultural gap between Arabs and Western Jews in Israel is no greater than the gap which separates Western Jews from Oriental Jews and the indigenous Arab population. Yet, researchers persist in attributing the conflict in the Middle East to `cultural factors,´ at a time when Jewish efforts are continuously made to integrate Oriental Jews into the social life of the country and ostensibly to "melt the various groups into one homogenous" entity. Rather than focus exclusively on culture and tradition, these researchers should study the nature of the Zionist state and how it has widened social and educational differences among the various groups in the country by its educational policies, residential segregation, the establishment of separate social institutions, and the primacy of religion in the state.

Even Sammy Smooha (1980), who acknowledges the role of Israeli policies in weakening the political fabric of Arab society, does not differ from other investigators who approach their analyses from the perspective of cultural pluralism. For this reason, Smooha argues that social conflict stems from the

cultural contradictions and rather than the issue of land and the future of the Palestinians as a nation.

b. Attributing the Arabs' lack of integration in Israeli society to the Arab-Israeli conflict distorts the reality facing the Arabs in Israel. The Arab states did not enter the Arab-Israeli conflict except in response to the conflict between the Zionist movement and the Palestinians. Since the Arabs in Israel are an integral part of the Palestinian people, they are a central component of the conflict, and the policies of the state toward them are based on this premise. Yet, the state persists in treating them as if they do not constitute a national group: to further its political objectives by fragmenting Arab society, the state defines them on the basis of ethnic-religious groupings differentiated along sect and tribal lines, and thus attempts to set them apart from each other and from other Palestinians.

c. Arguments put forward by Israeli researchers regarding the 'duality' of Arab personality contain demeaning misperceptions of the Arab individual generally and the Palestinian in particular. Those Palestinians who live in Israel, are described as being constantly divided by two types of identification. The essence of this claim is that Israeli Arabs are willing to forego national loyalty, attachment to the land, family and cultural affiliation in return for higher income under Israeli rule. In contrast to this, it is inconceivable that a Jew would abandon his national identity for material gain.

d. The claim that the Arabs have not been inducted into Israel's economic framework belies the fact that, as exploited proletariat, they constitute an essential and 'integrated' component of the labour force. Their 'integration' has left its stamp on Israeli social structure; for this reason it is impossible to understand Israeli society without grasping the position of its Arabs. However, Israeli researchers cannot acknowledge this socio-economic

fact since it conflicts with Zionist ideology, which considers the indigenous Arabs a passing phenomenon. This stance represents a convergence between the views of researchers and official Zionist ideology.

3. Most Israeli research on the Palestinians is distinguished by what is left out:

a. There is total neglect of the specific features of the state of Israel and its Zionist ideology that determine the position of the Arabs in society. At the same time, researchers do not fail to dissect the Arab mind, personality and traditional social structure in search for the real causes for the disadvantaged position of the Arabs in Israel and, as noted earlier, for the entire Arab-Israeli conflict.

b. Many of the studies avoid considering how state policies regarding the Arabs determine their position in society. For example, the imposition of the military government on the Arab population for 17 years (i.e., for half the period under consideration) has had a significant impact on the economic, social, and political life of the Israeli Arabs. Researchers prefer not to deal with this crucial period of the Arab experience. Similarly, they ignore the impact of the operative **Emergency Regulations** which date back to the time of the British Mandate: in spite of changes which were introduced in 1979, the core of the laws remains intact. Similarly, researchers do not take into account the nature of the central government's public policy and planning, especially in the areas of education, health care, economic development, and budgetary allocations. Were such policies to be investigated, they would provide convincing evidence that discriminatory practices by the government lie at the heart of the Arab predicament in Israel; it is not true that these government policies are applied reluctantly or that they are on the wane. Researchers also tend to ignore the impact of the expropriation of land, water resources, and other forms of property. Similarly, their studies do not ref-

lect the day-to-day interference by the Israeli government in the lives of Arab villagers, which is directed at the fragmentation of village life, the manipulation of election results, and the harrassment of politically active Arab youth.

c. To a very large extent Israeli researchers prefer not to use similar socio-economic indicators in comparing Arabs and Jews. Their rationale is that it is meaningless to compare a `traditional´ with a `modern´ society using such indicators, since the starting-points for the two groups are drastically different. Even if this claim were true, surely a comparison between Oriental Jews and Arabs (presumably from similar cultural backgrounds) would be legitimate, as would be comparsions between Palestinians living in Israel and those living outside. Studies of the latter type, to the extent that they exist, tend to be selective and focus on comparing the standards of living and primary educational attainment among Palestinians in Israel to those outside it. However, no mention is made of the fact that university education among Palestinians in the occupied territories, the larger Arab World, and outside it is by far more frequent than among Palestinians who live in Israel and are citizens of the state.

d. Israeli researchers invariably ignore the Arabs´ own contribution to the development of their villages. They emphasize the lack of local initiative, and do not mention the Arabs´ role in developing the educational system. For example, it is common knowledge that parents´ associations have actively and voluntarily raised funds from the local population in order to maintain a decent educational infrastructure in the Arab sector. Similarly, local donations enabled the building of schools and the establishment of public libraries, institutions which are taken for granted in the Jewish sector. In some cases, the representatives of local groups have found it necessary to seek financial aid for development projects of this sort from outside sources,

including foreign governments.

A conspicuous phenomenon in Arab villages is the establishment of voluntary work camps for local youth, the purpose of which is to contribute to such village projects as the construction of roads and the maintainance of public places. Such modest projects escape the attention of Israeli researchers.

e. The majority of Israeli researchers portray life among the Israeli Arabs in such a way as to emphasize the positive role of the state:

(i) These studies present an improved standard of living among Arabs in Israel. As proof, the authors rely upon various exterior indicators, such as changes in the landscape of the Arab village, the presence of new buildings, or changes in consumption patterns and ownership of durable goods. Israeli researchers compare the current economic situation of the Arabs to that of the past, but do not use the same indicators to compare it to that of the Jewish community. The gap between the two sectors remains great. What is forgotten here is that Arabs have saved their hard-earned money over a long period of time in order to enjoy these amenities, and in all likelihood would have attained these standards years ago had they been able to keep their land and enjoy its yield (or even had they been allowed to sell their land at current market prices). Instead, they were forced by the confiscatory procedures of the Zionist authorities to sell their land at a miniscule fraction of its market value.

(ii) Israeli research tends to focus on visible signs of development in the infrastructure of the Arab village such as roads, water, and electricity. However, they overlook the fact benefits to Arab villages were side-effects of developments taking place in Jewish settlements located in the midst of Arab concentrations, such as the Galilee.

Also not mentioned is the fact that Arab villages did not obtain these essential services until two decades after the establishment of the state. In contrast to Jewish settlements, many Arab villages still lack these basic amenities. For example, there is no comparison between the educational and health facilities in the Jewish sector and those available in Arab villages.

(iii)Israeli research stresses certain Arab behavioural characteristics which are considered to be negative from the perspective of the Israeli or western reader, who is unfamiliar with real circumstances in Arab villages. For example, unlicenced buildings are common in Arab villages, and are presented as proof of law violation by Arabs. These researchers recognize neither the intricacies of building laws nor the difficulty of securing building permits; the essence of the law is to choke the Arab sector and to provide rationalization for land confiscation. In addition, most master plans prepared by Arab localities have not been approved by the authorities, which makes it necessary to violate the `law.'

(iv) Most Israeli research represents Israeli Arabs as not contributing to the `development' of their own villages; instead, development is attributed to the initiatives of the Israeli government, particularly since Arabs tend not to believe in economic investments. The truth is that Israeli law and economic framework do not encourage Arabs to invest in productive economic enterprises. The circumstances of Israeli society compel the Palestinians to assume an intermediary economic role. Usually, they tend to invest in enterprises that are wholly owned and managed by their Jewish counterparts. Yet, we have shown the active role of the Arabs in developing their villages, especially in the area of education.

(v)Israeli studies tend to exaggerate the level of conflict and differentiation in the Arab sector, and to attribute it to family, clan and ethnic factors; by the same token, they ignore other unifying and integrating factors which bind Arab society in the face of adversity. More importantly, these investigators ignore the role of the authorities in perpetuating social divisions in the Arab sector through their policy of `divide and rule,' and through such practices as using the identity cards of Palestinians to register their ethnic-religious background and their membership in identifiable clans and families. Equally divisive is the establishment of alliances with Zionist political parties based on familial and clan membership. These researchers ignore the fact that the Arabs' future is determined to a very large by the policies of land confiscation, budgetary allocations, and the provision of general social services.

(vi)Israeli researchers are not truthful to statistical facts. They tend to use absolute figures without placing them in relative or comparative framework, by which the Jewish population would be taken as a measure of comparison. In other instances, statistical data are used without adequate explanations, thus giving the reader the wrong impression of reality. We pointed out earlier how educational data are used without alerting the reader that these data pertain to East Jerusalem (where educational institutions were developed prior to the establishment of the state of Israel), and without pointing out the extent of private Arab contribution to the development of the educational system. In the case of land confiscation, we have shown how Israeli researchers misrepresent the extent of the phenomenon through misinterpreting the data.

f. The reader will notice that this review did not deal with the position of Arab youth in Israel. Israeli researchers and official policy-makers who commission these studies ignore the situation of educated Arab youth in Israel; more importantly, they do not address the situation of the uneducated and unepmloyed strata among Israel's Arab youth, whose number now reaches the tens of thousands. As we have seen, the studies have concentrated on the Arab family, the **hamulah**, and national identity; studies of educated youth have focussed on the issue of split personality and divided national identity.

The academic neglect of Arab youth in Israel, at a time when corresponding studies on Jewish youth are abundant, is not accidental. Tackling this subject is bound to reveal severe inequality of opportunity; it is no exaggeration to say that this is the most serious problem facing Arab society under Israeli control. Israeli researchers have also ignored the circumstances of the Arabs in so-called `mixed towns.' Again, this is no accident, for the truth of the matter is that their situation is substantially worse than that of Arabs who live in rural areas. Regarding Arabs in mixed towns, the Israeli researcher would be very hard pressed to point to new built-up areas or opulent living styles as examples of the new affluence among Israeli Arabs.

The charcteristics of Israeli research examined in this review are both politically and ideologically motivated: they serve the interests of the state and help to shape its policies toward the Arab population. Some orientalists have attempted to justify this motivation on the basis of the "will for national survival" (Yadlin,1985:88). However, this review posits that, by and large, Israeli investigations of the Arabs look for and come up with findings which merely support and confirm their initial positions (See Shamir,1985:9-10). It is a crucially important fact that Israeli policies draw extensively on orientalist studies that purport to be scientific and objective, while in reality their function is to support and vindicate official policies. To a

very large extent, academic researchers on the Arabs have a reciprocal, even symbiotic relationship with policy-makers.

It is important to realize that many researchers dealt with in this study (in particular those known as `orienatlists´) eventually entered into partnership with those who sponsored their studies. This was possible because of their acknowledged status as `experts´ and their experience as `consultants´ for various Israeli institutes and research centers, including those affiliated with the Israeli intelligence community. Therefore, Israeli policies will not be influenced by new `discoveries´ on the Arabs and Palestinians if they contradict established policies (Leneer,1985:43-44). In certain cases, the government actually conceals new information in order to pursue its existing policies toward the Arabs (cf. Shamir, 1985:13).

Finally, is there anything new?

Studies reviewed up to this point accurately present the prevailing orientations of social science research in Israel. We have pointed out that although Smooha´s article (1980) exposed the true nature of Israeli policies toward its Arab citizens, he remains committed to the mainstream approach which he developed in his earlier writings on the subject. His analysis of Israeli society based on the concept of cultural pluralism puts him in the same camp as other Israeli researchers: to them, the Middle East conflict arises from cultural contradictions rather than the political issues of national rights and self-determination.

In contrast to Smooha and others who conform to the mainstream approaches in Israeli social science, there is a minority of researchers who, in spite of their Zionist orientation, view the conflict accurately as arising from two nationalisms (Yehoshua Porath, 1971 and 1978), rather than from a legitimate nationalism embodied in the Zionist movement colliding with an illegitimate one reflected in a fragmented and disorganized Arab factions. Baruch Kimmer-

ling made a similar claim in the introduction to his 1974 Ph.D. thesis: the conlfict is essentially between two nationalist movements. He also demonstrated how the policies of the British Mandatory government facilitated the transfer of land from native Arab inhabitants to Jewish settlers (1974:67-68). In a subsequent writing, he defined the conflict in Palestine as a

> permanent conflict around national resources (such as territory and land) which are perceived as being scarce, as well as a confrontation over the future content and definition of the collectivity and its physical and social boundaries (Kimmerling,1979:5).

Kimmerling reveals in his thesis that Israeli policies toward the Arab population stem from the premise that the conflict revolves around land. Yet, at the same time, Israeli policies (like the majority of the social science investigations) portray the Palestinians as marginal to the conflict!

Dov Shinar, in a study which analyzed Palestinian visual art, concludes that art contributes to the building of a Palestinian nationalist movement; this explanation runs counter to that offered by Israelis, who regard this art as a form of political propaganda (1984:14).

A genuine alternative to the current `scientific-public relations´ literature on Israeli Arabs reviewed in this study is the periodical **Mahbarot Lamehkar Velebekkoret** [**Essays in Research and Criticism**], which is put out by a group of researchers in the social sciences and the humanities. As stated by the editors in the first issue (1978), the objectives of the journal are:

> (1) to analyze relations of exploitation, discrimination, oppression, isolation, and backwardness, which are considered to be central expressions of a stratified society, and to understand the causes of these phenomena;
>
> (2) to provide a platform for critical examination of the dominant positivist and `neutral´ concepts which prevail in the social sciences. Such orientations, in our view, constitute an obstacle to a realistic social understanding, and to suggestion for problem-resolution.

Based on these premises, a number of the articles focussed on relations between Oriental and Western Jews to reveal exploitation and oppression of the former by the latter. Other articles focussed on the processes by which women are exploited in society, while others examined the role played by the educational system in sustaining class gradations in society.

Concerning the topic examined in this review, the magazine published in its third issue (1979) a translation of Henry Rosenfeld's article (5-40) on the class structure of the Arabs in Israel, which was originally published in English in 1978. Rosenfeld clarifies both the ideological premises of Zionism as manifested in its policy toward the Arabs, as well as the political and economic means to ensure their continued subordination in Israeli society. He also explains the progressive developments which have taken place in the Arab villages, despite the obstructionist nature of official policy toward the Arab population. His main focus is the impact of economic transformations on the politicization of Arabs in their struggle against policies of discrimination. He concludes that "the regime has created the present policy to meet its needs and defends itself in the face of its consequences and the changes taking place" (34).

In the same issue Jonathan Oppenheimer published an article titled "The Druzes in Israel as Arabs and non-Arabs" (41-58). He criticizes the prevailing orientations of Israeli research on the Arabs, particularly the attempt to tear the Druzes away from the rest of the Arab community and to consider them as a separate national entity. He shows that the position of the Druzes is a direct result of the peculiar nature of the Israeli state; Oppenheimer asserts that the Arabs in Israel, including the Druzes, "belong to the same society which is comprised of many religious elements, and is connected by means of a multiplicity of villages" (46). In examining the effect of socio-economic change on the Druzes, he demonstrates that this change is not significantly

different from that which affected the other Arab villages (52). According to socio-economic and cultural criteria, the Druzes are an integral part of the Arabs in Israel (53); yet from a political-legal perspective, they are treated by the state under a different set of bureacuratic measures. This is intended to sever them from the rest of the Arabs in Israel and to confuse their status and identity (55).

In the fifth issue (1980), the magazine published a translation of an article by the Palestinian sociologist Salim Tamari concerning the policies of the Israeli government toward Gaza and the West Bank, which aim to annex economically the occupied territories. The article is entitled "The Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza Strip - Sociology of Dependency" (49-71). The tenth issue (1984) was devoted to a study by Charles Kamen entitled "After the Disaster: The Arabs in Israel 1948-1950" (91). Kamen's research was prompted by the academic neglect in Israel of the social transformation experienced by the Palestinians in the aftermath of 1948 War and the establishment of the state of Israel. He expresses his bewilderment at how this crucial period was neglected:

> During one year a national community was destroyed, the majority of its members were dispersed, and those who remained within what became Israel were pushed to the margins of society, which forged ahead and developed after the establishment of the state [of Israel]. In spite of all this, researchers did not treat the change which had taken place in a systematic manner, although it had far-reaching consequences not only for those who ended up outside the boundaries of the state, but for those who remained within it.(16)

Kamen demonstrates that the Arabs in Israel were forced to build a new society from scratch. Their history is, to a very large extent, the history of constructing a new Arab society (71).

> The social and national structure of the Palestinian Arabs which existed at the end of the Mandate period was totaly destroyed. The human

> basis of the society was badly damaged as a result of the departure of some and the expulsion of the majority of the Arabs of the area allocated to
>
> Israel, and the wrong perpetrated by the Israeli government in not allowing any, except a small minority, to return. (69)

Eventually, a group of young writers began to coalesce around the magazine in an attempt to develop a critical alternative to the mainstream of social science investigations in Israel. Some members of the group conducted a series of studies on the situation of the Arabs in Israel, while others undertook to revise the interpretation of the country's political-economic history. Lev Louis Grinberg researched the truck-drivers' strike of 1931, and showed the attempts of the Zionist movement through the Histadrut to stifle the strike, to prevent any Arab-Jewish cooperation during the strike, and ultimately to prevent any long-term cooperation between the two groups following its termination (1986). Similarly, Girhson Shefer studied the socio-economic changes arising from the Palestinian-Zionist conflict -- particularly the role of the employment marketplace and the economy of land purchases -- and how these factors have transformed Palestine to a settler society for the Jews. In assessing the role of the conflict in the context of economic relations, Shefer explored how these relations determined the nature of Jewish settler society since the final days of the Ottoman empire. He concludes that "the unity of the Jewish society is not the outcome of relations among Jews, but is the result of relations between Jews and Arabs" (1986). Shefer examines three Zionist institutions established in the Jewish sector in Mandatory Palestine, and reveals their crucial role in dominating the economy and land of the country: (1) political parties which strove to exclude Arabs from the labour market; (2) in the areas of property protection and surveillance, **Hashomer** and the **Haganah** dominated the labour market and competed with Arabs for the same jobs; (3) the **Kibbutz** acted as an exclusivist Jewish

establishment in the areas of labour and land acquisition.

Finally, Michael Shalev examined the connection between the **Histadrut** and Arabs since its establsihment in the British Mandate period, as well as the significance of this institution in determining the political conflict between Palestinians and Jewish settlers. The author shows how the silencing of voices demanding the class struggle shortly after the establishment of the state of Israel is essential in understanding the development of society. His research shows that the **Histadrut** was used to co-opt Arabs, which avoided the state's direct intervention in achieving this control of the Arab population. According to the author, this explains why the **Histadrut** maintained two separate structures (one for Arab and the other for Jewish workers), and why it refrained from establishing labour councils in the Arab sector.

My objective in this article has been to review the writings of Israeli social scientists on the Arabs. Evidently, a large portion of this research justifies Israeli plicies, but also aids the state in furthering the policies of differentiation adopted toward the Arabs. Much of this research reflects the Zionist attitude of superiority toward the Arabs in general and the Palestinians in particulr, and denies outright that the latter are a people committed to the struggle for national self-determination. Recently, however, a group of young researchers have begun to expose the current trends in research. They are suggesting new critical and theoretical perspectives from which to study Israeli society and the relations between Arabs and Jews.

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